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
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*Arms Control:
The U.S. Perspective*

*Article by
ACDA Director
John Holum*

August 1997



U.S. FOREIGN POLICY A G E N D A

Arms Control: The U.S. Perspective

“The United States, as the world’s only remaining superpower, must continue making arms control a central element of its foreign policy and national security strategy,” says John Holum, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

In an overview of U.S. arms control policy in the focus section of this issue, Holum reviews the string of arms control successes the United States has achieved in recent years:

- the U.S. Senate ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention this spring, global implementation is underway, and initial on-site inspections have begun.**
- Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed in March to negotiate a third Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty as soon as the Russian Duma ratifies the second one. This will lead to the destruction of the first strategic nuclear warheads; in the past, only launchers and delivery vehicles were limited or reduced.**
- President Clinton was the first of 150 leaders to sign the global nuclear test ban; and Brazil announced this summer that it would join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was indefinitely extended in 1995 after a hard fought U.S. effort.**

This electronic journal tracks the progress of these efforts and forecasts future negotiations. Also in the focus section, Deputy National Security Adviser James Steinberg discusses critical U.S. non-proliferation efforts; Under Secretary of Defense Walter Slocombe describes how the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Flank Agreement, an update of the CFE treaty, enhances U.S. and European security; and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Susan Koch describes the U.S. program to help dismantle nuclear weapons in Russia, Belarus, Kazakstan and Ukraine.

Senator Patrick Leahy, in the commentary section, analyzes U.S. efforts to ban anti-personnel landmines. A chronology, reflecting more than 70 years of arms control history, and fact sheets on a number of U.S. arms control initiatives are featured in Backgrounding Key Issues.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY A G E N D A

*An Electronic Journal of the
U. S. Information Agency*

ARMS CONTROL: THE U.S. PERSPECTIVE

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U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
AGENDA

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ARMS CONTROL: A CENTRAL ELEMENT OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

*By John D. Holum
Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency*

Experts have identified the threat of so-called “loose nukes” — nuclear warheads or fissile material that might slip out of government control — as “one of the leading dangers of our time,” Holum says. Ensuring that this never happens “will be an extremely complex task,” he noted, “requiring us to call upon almost every arms control and non-proliferation tool we have developed over the last 35 years.”

U.S. arms control successes have made the world safer. The overriding reality is, however, that we still live in a dangerous world, one still bristling with weapons of mass destruction, the persistent danger of proliferation by rogue regimes, convulsive nationalism, and terrorists. It is a world in which 40 countries now have the technical and material ability to develop nuclear weapons, should they decide to do so; more than 15 nations have at least short-range ballistic missiles — and many of those are pursuing weapons of mass destruction; and some 20 countries have chemical weapons programs.

In light of these post-Cold War dangers, the United States, as the world’s only remaining superpower, must continue making arms control a central element of its foreign policy and national security strategy.

President Clinton, in September 1996, was the first world leader to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty — perhaps the most sought after goal in the history of arms control. The treaty now boasts almost 150 signatories. It will end nuclear explosive testing for all time.

When he signed the CTBT, the President outlined to the U.N. General Assembly six U.S. arms control and non-proliferation goals. One of them — Senate ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) — already has been achieved. The president also called for a ban on unsafeguarded fissile material production for

nuclear weapons or other explosive devices, enhancing the nuclear non-proliferation regime, strengthening compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), a global ban on Anti-Personnel Landmines (APL), and continued reductions in nuclear weapons.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

The Senate gave its consent to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in April 1997 as a protection against chemical attack by rogue states and terrorists. The United States continues to call on other nations to sign and ratify the treaty without delay; 95 nations have now done so. Meanwhile, we are destroying our 30,000-ton chemical weapons stockpile, and Russia is committed to destroying its 40,000-ton declared stockpile.

FISSILE MATERIAL CUTOFF TREATY

We are urging the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to begin negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), which would end forever the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons. The United States, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom already announced that they have stopped fissile material production for nuclear weapons. An FMCT would lock a ban on production for weapons into place for the nuclear weapons states and threshold states and significantly contribute to the nuclear disarmament process.

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

Universal adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and a strengthening of the tools needed to ensure compliance with it is another goal cited by the president. This would include new International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards such as environmental sampling and access to undeclared facilities. We are urging all nations that have not joined the NPT to do so without delay. Brazil announced in June 1997 that it will become a part of the NPT. Once Brazil joins, only four countries will remain outside this cornerstone of non-proliferation treaties.

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

We also seek the means to enhance compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) through such measures as mandatory declarations and on-site activities. The United States is an active member of the Ad Hoc Group striving to create a legally binding instrument to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of the BWC.

ANTI-PERSONNEL LANDMINES

The United States is pressing in the CD for swift negotiation of a global ban on the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines, which maim or kill some 25,000 people each year. This is a leading priority of the second Clinton term. Meanwhile, the U.S. continues its own moratorium on the production and transfer of APL and urges other nations to join it. The U.S. also urges states that have not yet done so, to ratify the amended landmines protocol (Protocol II) of the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS REDUCTION

Finally, the United States continues to push for further progress in reducing the global stockpile of nuclear weapons. Efforts by both the United States and Russia to dismantle strategic weapon delivery systems such as aircraft and missiles are



Department of Defense photo by R.D. Ward

Russians workers cut apart pieces of a Russian Tu-95 strategic bomber aircraft for use as scrap material. Destruction of the Tupolev aircraft is part of Russian compliance with the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.

well ahead of the schedule established under the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I). For example, limits for deployed strategic weapon delivery vehicles required by December 5, 1999, were met by the beginning of 1997. In addition, separate from START I, the U.S. has eliminated almost 10,000 nuclear warheads since 1990. Russia reports that it, too, is eliminating nuclear warheads. Kazakstan, Belarus, and Ukraine have turned over the thousands of nuclear warheads formerly located in their countries to Russia, and are now free of nuclear weapons.

The follow-on treaty to the START I Treaty — the START II Treaty — provides an orderly mechanism for the United States and Russia to

dramatically reduce the resources devoted to strategic offensive arms, as well as enhancing stability and security. The U.S. Senate has given its advice and consent on START II; however, the Russian Duma has yet to approve the treaty. President Yeltsin has underscored the importance of the treaty's prompt ratification, and while we cannot predict when the Russian Duma will act, we hope that the Senate's positive vote, as well as the clear benefits START II provides, will encourage the Russian Duma to act in a similar fashion.

Once START II enters into force, the United States and Russia will immediately begin negotiations on a START III agreement, as agreed by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin during their March 1997 Helsinki Summit. START III will include reductions in deployed strategic warheads to 2,000 to 2,500 by December 31, 2007. Furthermore, the United States and Russia agreed to ensure that the benefits of the START Treaties are irreversible by seeking to resolve issues related to the goal of making the current START Treaties unlimited in duration.

Entry into force and implementation of START II and achieving START III will make a major contribution toward the ultimate goal of the United States and all NPT Parties of a world free of nuclear weapons and the threat of war. This process cannot occur overnight, however. The U.S. continues to hold that progress on disarmament can only be accomplished on a step-by-step basis, carefully taking into account the legitimate security concerns of all states.

Also at Helsinki, the two leaders affirmed their nations' commitment to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and confirmed that both sides must have the option to establish and deploy effective theater missile defense systems.

COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION

Through funding provided by the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program (also known as the Nunn-Lugar program because it was proposed by Senator Richard Lugar and former Senator Sam

Nunn), the United States has helped Russia and the New Independent States transport, safeguard, and destroy their nuclear weapons. For example, the U.S. is currently providing design and construction assistance to Russia for a facility to store safely and securely fissile material from dismantled nuclear weapons at Mayak.

Negotiating and ensuring the elimination of nuclear warheads and their fissile material will be an extremely complex task. The threat of "loose nukes" — nuclear warheads or fissile material that might slip out of government control — has been rightly identified by many experts as one of the leading dangers of our time. Ensuring that this never becomes a reality is one of the greatest challenges we face.

There are four essential elements in a global approach to reducing this aspect of the Cold War's legacy. First, states must work cooperatively to stop nuclear smuggling in its tracks and to ensure that all weapons-usable nuclear materials are secure and accounted for. In June 1996, at a nuclear summit in Moscow, participating states agreed on a "Program for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Material," to ensure increased cooperation in all aspects of prevention and detection, exchange of information, investigation, and prosecution. The Moscow Summit also reaffirmed every state's fundamental responsibility to ensure, at the national level, the security of all nuclear materials in its possession — which includes effective systems of nuclear material accounting and control, as well as physical protection.

Second, states must work together to build security through transparency. Effective monitoring and verification regimes influence compliance by all parties with arms control agreements. Such measures as data exchanges and mutual inspections build confidence in the stability and irreversibility of reductions and ensure control of both warheads and fissile materials. The exchange of such information is not altruism, but a practical necessity to reduce the ambiguity, uncertainty, and ignorance that impedes the prompt completion of nuclear reductions.

Third, we must do everything in our power to prevent excess stockpiling of fissile materials. As mentioned, we should pursue a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, to cut off production of unsafeguarded highly enriched uranium or plutonium and thus cap the amount available for weapons. The growing accumulation of separated civilian plutonium around the world poses proliferation risks of its own. The United States believes that each nation — whatever its fuel-cycle choices — should not accumulate excess stockpiles and should begin reducing these stockpiles over time. The Moscow agreement is heartening in that, at least in the context of managing excess weapons material, the aim is to reduce all stocks of separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium through peaceful use of non-explosive, safe and final disposal as soon as practicable.

Fourth, we need to dispose of excess plutonium and highly enriched uranium — both to confirm that arms reductions will never be reversed and to ensure that this material will never fall into the wrong hands. The United States strongly supports the Moscow Summit decision to initiate broad multilateral cooperation to dispose of excess fissile materials. Long-term disposition options are being examined evenhandedly — taking into account non-proliferation, safety, technical, environmental, and economic factors. However, uncertainty about the ultimate disposition of fissile materials from dismantled weapons must never be an impediment to the prompt completion of nuclear reductions.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

In addition to these arms control priorities, the United States continues to press ahead on conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures.

The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, has resulted in the elimination of more than 51,300 tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery pieces, combat aircraft and attack helicopters and more than 2,700 on-site inspections. CFE remains the cornerstone of

European security and a model for conventional arms control in other regions of the world.

Under the mandate of the 1996 CFE Review Conference, which assessed the treaty's operation and implementation during its first five years, the 30 states parties have begun a process of adapting the treaty to the post-Cold War era. In this process, the U.S. and its NATO allies will ensure that the treaty continues to promote security and stability in Europe. Also, the U.S. will continue its efforts to ensure that arms control in the Balkans is fully complied with and contributes to stability in the entire region. We also need to bolster international efforts to promote transparency and restraint in transfers of conventional arms and sensitive dual-use items.

REGIONAL CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES

Finally, the United States is intensifying efforts to develop, foster, and support regional confidence- and security-building measures in Eurasia, the Middle East, the Asia-Pacific region, Latin America, and Africa. Regional arms control has become increasingly important in the post-Cold War world as we enter a new international security environment marked by regional instability and tensions generated by political, military, ethnic, and religious antagonisms. One way to enhance U.S. national security and regional stability is to promote adoption of arms control measures worldwide. This is a significant area of future arms control efforts by countries affected by such tension. Such efforts will reduce tension, promote or maintain peace, and remove incentives for arms races or development of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

The United States has an ambitious agenda. But given the challenges the world faces, an agenda any less ambitious would be less than responsible. We all must do everything we can to ensure that what had been our weapons of last resort become the least accessible weapons in the world. ●

U.S. NON-PROLIFERATION STRATEGY: “NO HIGHER PRIORITY”

*By James Steinberg
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs*

A key element of U.S. non-proliferation strategy is to address “the underlying conflicts and tensions that drive proliferation” on the Korean Peninsula and in the Middle East and South Asia, says Steinberg, who is deputy national security adviser and assistant to the president. The following is an adaptation of his June 9 remarks at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington.

Clearly, there is no single policy that can tackle today’s complex and varied proliferation challenges. But President Clinton has made clear that the United States has no higher priority.

There are three primary elements of U.S. strategy. First, establishing and strengthening international treaty regimes; second, dealing with the supply side of the problem through multilateral mechanisms to control the spread of proliferation-related technologies, equipment, and material; and finally, addressing the demand side by designing and implementing regional approaches to reduce incentives for proliferation.

Our first line of defense is international treaties, which establish both the normative and legal structures to address the proliferation threat. The past four years have capped a remarkable, decades-long effort to put in place the key elements of a global framework — the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The challenge now is two-fold: first, to ensure the widest possible membership in these regimes; and second, to design and implement effective verification and enforcement systems.

The nuclear regime has made the greatest strides forward. With the help of our leadership, the NPT is a permanent feature of the international framework and adherence is almost universal. The U.N. Security Council has created a solid precedent for taking action against countries that

have violated the treaty, such as Iraq and North Korea.

The NPT’s legal status is bolstered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and its comprehensive safeguards inspections. The international community received a sobering wake-up call when we discovered Iraq’s clandestine nuclear weapons program. We responded by strengthening the IAEA’s role and resources, culminating last month with the approval of the new model protocol. The protocol will substantially fortify the IAEA’s authority and ability to detect secret nuclear weapons activities in NPT parties. President Clinton intends to submit this protocol for Senate ratification early next year.

The success of the global NPT regime is enhanced by regional nuclear weapons free zones, such as those in Latin America, Africa, and the South Pacific. The United States is now working with the parties to the Southeast Asia nuclear free zone to resolve issues that stand in the way of U.S. adherence, and we look forward to learning more about the proposed nuclear free zone in Central Asia. We also hope that discussions among appropriate parties for establishing nuclear free zones in South Asia and the Middle East can begin in the near future.

President Clinton has also called for negotiating a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty — a treaty of special value in regions where destabilizing arms races are jeopardizing security and drawing resources away from social needs. We believe the negotiations

should proceed without delay and on their own merits. No matter how attractive in theory, linkage to a timebound, comprehensive nuclear disarmament scheme simply isn't practical. And the stakes are too high to allow the perfect to become the enemy of the good.

In contrast to the nuclear regime, international efforts to prevent the spread of chemical and biological weapons are less well-developed. Now that the Chemical Weapons Convention has entered into force, we must ensure that the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has the resources and the political support for implementation. CWC members will need to work together to expand adherence to the CWC. In particular, we hope that the Russian Duma will ratify the CWC as soon as possible.

In some respects, the Biological Weapons Convention poses an even greater challenge. Although the treaty has been in force since 1972 and membership is nearly universal, the regime lacks any compliance or enforcement mechanisms. At the United Nations last year, President Clinton called on the international community to complete, by 1998, a legally binding protocol to the BWC that would establish tough compliance procedures, including appropriate on-site inspections. We look forward to working to achieve this objective.

Our second major non-proliferation tool is promoting cooperation among suppliers to control the export of technology, equipment, and materials that can contribute to the development of weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery systems. This is a challenging prospect. The new market democracies of Central Europe and the former Soviet Union are struggling to overcome economic hardship and create effective export control systems. And except for some very specialized technologies, a long-term strategy of technology denial has real limits. In today's increasingly open societies, it will become more and more difficult to regulate the transfer or indigenous development of the basic industrial infrastructure and technical know-how necessary to produce weapons of mass destruction.

Nonetheless, there are important steps the international community can and must take to address this challenge, both through national and multilateral mechanisms. Most Western suppliers have tightened domestic controls of dual-use commodities and increased information sharing and law enforcement cooperation to fight the smuggling of dangerous technologies. Now, we need to expand membership and refine the multilateral export control efforts in the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, and the Missile Technology Control Regime. The 33-country Wassenaar Arrangement offers a unique vehicle for strengthening responsibility and transparency in the sale of conventional arms and dual-use goods, and for mobilizing international support for restraining trade to pariah countries.

Ultimately, the effectiveness of these multilateral efforts depends on the full participation of all potential suppliers. In particular, Russia and China are key to meeting the supply challenge.

We have a strong national interest in working with Russia to ensure that its future lies in closer relations with the West. The new NATO-Russia Founding Act is but one example of our broader strategy to increase Russia's political and economic integration. Nonetheless, there are economic and political fears stemming from Russia's loss of traditional markets that create pressure for developing a supply relationship with countries of concern. I want to mention, in particular, the issue of nuclear and missile assistance to Iran. While we value President Yeltsin's assurances that Russia will limit its nuclear assistance to Iran, we remain concerned that Iran will seek to exploit Russian construction of a nuclear power plant to acquire expertise and infrastructure that can support its nuclear weapons ambitions, even though President Yeltsin has made clear that this is not Russia's intent.

We are also troubled by recent reports that Russian entities are providing assistance to Iran's long-range ballistic missile program. Obviously, it is not in Russia's long-term interests to help create a missile force that could threaten Russia itself. President

Yeltsin has stated that Russia opposes such assistance, and we will continue to work closely with the Russian government to ensure the implementation of that policy.

China also presents a mixed picture. On the one hand, China has played an increasingly helpful role in supporting the international regimes, including adoption of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and (indefinite) extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and working with us to resolve specific non-proliferation concerns, such as the North Korean nuclear threat. On the other hand, we remain deeply concerned about some of China's weapons supply relationships and the limitations of its inadequate, although improving, system of export controls to prevent unauthorized sales.

Over the past year, we have made some progress in dealing with these issues. China has curtailed its nuclear cooperation with Iran — especially in areas that might contribute to Iran's nuclear weapons capability — and China is taking steps to fulfill its pledge not to assist unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. By putting in place an effective export control system, China can help establish a basis for activating the 1985 Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement between our two nations.

At the same time, problems remain. We recently imposed sanctions against several Chinese individuals and private companies for contributing to Iran's chemical weapons program. We are also concerned by continued reports of Chinese missile-related exports to Pakistan and Iran. We will continue to use all the tools we have — cooperation, persistent diplomacy, targeted sanctions when appropriate — to encourage improvements in China's non-proliferation efforts. We believe China must increasingly come to see that it is in China's own interest not to aid the spread of dangerous weapons or to fuel instability in its own neighborhood.

The third major component of our non-proliferation strategy is to address the underlying conflicts and tensions that drive proliferation in three key regions: the Korean Peninsula, the Middle East, and South Asia. In these regions, the

international treaties and multilateral export control agreements may help to slow proliferation, or at least create barriers that deter countries from openly challenging non-proliferation norms. But substantial progress will require a change in the security calculation of the states in question.

On the Korean Peninsula, the 1994 Agreed Framework has frozen North Korea's program to produce nuclear material and established a plan for eventual North Korean compliance with IAEA safeguards, removal of nuclear materials and dismantling of North Korea's nuclear facilities. At the same time, the Agreed Framework is potentially vulnerable to political pressures and regional tensions. Moreover, we remain concerned by North Korea's chemical weapons capabilities and missile program, including exports. To meet these threats, our broader security strategy in the region includes maintaining a strong alliance with South Korea and beginning the four-party talks to establish a permanent peace on the peninsula, as well as our direct contacts with North Korea on missile and chemical weapons issues.

In the Middle East, proliferation is driven by the strategic rivalry between Iran and Iraq for supremacy in the Gulf and by the absence of a comprehensive peace between Israel and its neighbors. Our strategy has three main elements: First, we must remain vigilant about Iraq's efforts to revive its weapons programs, by maintaining Security Council restraints on Iraq's military capabilities and supporting the intrusive inspection regimes conducted by the U.N. Special Commission and the IAEA. Second, we are seeking to strengthen the international effort to deny Iran the means to develop nuclear and chemical weapons and ballistic missiles. Finally, we remain deeply committed to continuing an active role in helping to reduce tensions and resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, which would allow regional arms control and security talks to resume and ultimately remove incentives for proliferation.

In South Asia, India and Pakistan have acquired nuclear and missile capabilities and continue to expand their programs, although each side has

avoided acknowledging its capabilities and deploying such weapons. A near term political solution to proliferation in South Asia is unlikely.

But there are hopeful signs that the new governments in New Delhi and Islamabad are genuinely interested in pursuing dialogue and improving bilateral relations, which may reinforce

the de facto restraints that both sides are observing. The United States will continue to encourage India and Pakistan to settle their differences at the negotiating table. We also continue to urge both sides to move in the right direction on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, and to freeze and eventually eliminate their nuclear and missile arsenals. ●

CFE FLANK AGREEMENT: ENHANCING U.S. AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

*By Walter B. Slocombe
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy*

The Flank Agreement to the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty went into effect in May 1997, shortly after the U.S. Senate approved it and President Clinton signed the resolution of ratification. The agreement retains CFE limits on tanks, armored combat vehicles, and artillery in the Russian and Ukrainian flank zone, but applies them to a smaller area. The regions removed from the original flank zone will be subject to new constraints and additional verification and transparency measures. In this article, adapted from his April 1997 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Slocombe explores the impact of the Flank Agreement on the military security of the United States, its NATO allies, and its friends in the flank zone.

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) is a vital element of the new, more favorable security situation in Europe. When the treaty was signed in 1990, it represented a major advance in European security and arms control, through its unprecedented requirements for reductions in conventional military equipment, detailed annual exchanges of military information, and intrusive verification. Consolidation of those strengths and benefits continues to be a major objective for the United States and our NATO allies.

For those benefits to continue, the CFE Treaty must adjust to changes in Europe, particularly to the breakup of the Warsaw Pact and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The CFE Treaty Flank Agreement is such an adjustment. It is an important part of the NATO position for adapting the CFE Treaty to broader changes in Europe, which include the enlargement of the alliance. The Flank Agreement will preserve the long-term benefits of the CFE Treaty and keep the adaptation process on track.

I would like to concentrate particularly on the impact of the CFE Flank Agreement and surrounding regions. It is the firm view of the Department of Defense that the Flank Agreement serves the military security interests of all those countries. Our security and theirs would be adversely affected without the Flank Agreement.

The flank region, one of four zones into which the CFE area of application is divided, covers Norway, Iceland, Turkey, Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and parts of Ukraine and Russia. The flank limits were established during the CFE Treaty negotiations primarily to address Norwegian and Turkish concerns that the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Central and Eastern Europe might result in a significant buildup of Soviet forces on or near their borders. The original flank limits allowed the Soviet Union to hold within the northern and southern parts of the flank zone up to 1,850 tanks, 2,775 artillery pieces and 1,800 armored combat vehicles (ACVs) in active units, and up to 1,000 tanks, 900 artillery pieces, and 800 ACVs in designated storage sites in specific parts of the flank region.

Approximately one year after the CFE Treaty was signed, the Soviet Union dissolved. In May 1992, before the treaty entered into force, the former Soviet states which succeeded to the CFE Treaty (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakstan, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) signed the Tashkent Agreement which divided the equipment entitlements of the Soviet Union. Under that agreement, Russian active units in the flank zone may hold no more than 700 tanks, 580 ACVs, and 1,280 artillery pieces. Russia was allocated another 600 tanks, 800 ACVs, and 400 artillery pieces in

Designated Permanent Storage Sites in a specified part of the northern portion of the flank region. Ukrainian active units in the flank zone are limited to 280 tanks, 350 ACVs, and 390 artillery pieces, with another 400 tanks and 500 artillery pieces in Designated Permanent Storage Sites. Russia and Ukraine are the only CFE states whose Treaty-Limited Equipment is subject to geographic sub-limits within their national territory.

Thus, Russian and Ukrainian forces were left with far less flexibility in the flank region than had been given to the Soviet Union. Beginning in the fall of 1992, both states asked the other CFE parties for relief from the flank limits, which they felt were too restrictive.

Ukraine was particularly concerned about the economic burden of having to move TLE, relocate units from its flank zone, and build new infrastructure in the interior to receive them. Russia shared that concern, but its primary focus was on the need for a larger equipment entitlement in the flank — especially ACVs — given the instabilities in the North Caucasus Military District (e.g. Chechnya) and Caucasus states (Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan).

As the United States and the other CFE parties considered the calls by Russia and Ukraine for relief from the flank limits, two security concerns were paramount in our thinking. First, and most important, was the need to retain the integrity of the CFE Treaty. The Russian military felt so strongly about the need for additional TLE in the flank zone that at various points their representatives threatened to urge Russian withdrawal from the treaty if their flank demands were not satisfied. An end to the CFE Treaty would have greatly affected the United States and our NATO allies by undermining a key element of the new European security situation. The Russian government's official position was that while Russia would implement all of CFE's other provisions in good faith, it would not be able to achieve compliance with the Article V (flank) obligations without jeopardizing its security. Indeed, Russia's overall compliance with its CFE obligations has been good. Russia fulfilled its overall notified

CFE reduction obligations on schedule by November 1995. This involved the destruction or conversion to non-military use of over 11,000 pieces of TLE, including tanks, artillery, ACVs, combat aircraft and attack helicopters.

This Russian effort represented one-fifth of total CFE equipment destruction — over 53,000 pieces of TLE by the 30 CFE states. Despite that record, allies believed that continued failure by Russia to meet flank obligations would have the effect of undermining the legitimacy of the flank regime as a whole, and possibly of the treaty itself. This could have very serious security implications for all members of the NATO alliance, especially our allies in the flank region.

The second major consideration was that any adjustment to the CFE flank arrangements must not adversely affect the security of any CFE state or of any other state near the Russian flank zone. The Russian flank limits did not affect the immediate military security of the United States or most of our NATO allies. However, they did have such an immediate effect on Turkey and Norway, and on friends in the region such as the Baltic states, Finland, Ukraine, Moldova, and the Caucasus states — and thus an important, if indirect, effect on our security as well.

One Russian proposal during the flank negotiations — to establish a CFE “exclusion zone” in the south — was completely unacceptable from both perspectives. Suspending important provisions of the treaty in any part of the CFE area of application would be contrary to the need to preserve the integrity of the treaty as a whole. It also could potentially allow Russia to build up forces in the southern part of the flank that could threaten Turkey and the neighboring former Soviet states.

Concern for the military security of neighboring states also led us to reject proposals that could lead to unacceptably large TLE increases in either the southern or northern part of the Russian flank zone.

Finally, and very important, it was essential that any solution to the flank problem be consistent with

treaty requirements regarding territorial sovereignty and host state consent to stationing of forces.

Resolution of the flank issue took over two years and the involvement of all CFE states. The United States undertook intense consultations with our NATO allies (especially Turkey and Norway), Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the other treaty partners to achieve resolution of this difficult issue. In addition, we consulted with interested non-treaty states, including the neutral Nordic and Baltic states. As we did throughout the original CFE negotiations, the NATO allies adopted common positions in the flank negotiations, which we presented to Russia, Ukraine, and the other CFE parties.

Consultations with particularly interested CFE parties took place both multilaterally, within the CFE Joint Consultative Group (JCG) in Vienna, among NATO allies in NATO's High Level Task Force on Arms Control, and bilaterally in capitals. Because of the specific military concerns involved, the Department of Defense worked actively with Ministry of Defense counterparts, particularly with interested parties such as Turkey, Norway, and Russia.

In September 1995, NATO tabled a proposal at the JCG to resolve the flank issue. The NATO proposal, on which the final Flank Agreement is based, consisted of several specific elements:

- maintenance of the treaty flank limits;
- removal of some defined areas from the Russian and Ukrainian flank zones, so that the treaty flank limits applied to a smaller region, and TLE movement was encouraged toward the interior;
- constraints on TLE in the areas removed from the flank zone, and additional transparency and verification measures in the "old" and "new" flank zones.

The JCG agreed in November 1995 on the outlines for a Flank Agreement, following those provided in the NATO proposal. Intensive

consultations and negotiations followed in Vienna and in capitals, to conclude the details within that general outline. Final agreement was reached at the CFE Review Conference in May 1996.

Under the Flank Agreement, the following areas will no longer be part of the flank zone: Odessa oblast in Ukraine; Volgograd and Astrakhan oblasts in southern Russia; an eastern part of the Rostov oblast in southern Russia; Kushchevskaya repair facility in southern Russia and a narrow corridor in Krasnodar Kray leading to Kushchevskaya; and Pskov oblast in northern Russia.

Although those areas will not be subject to the flank limits, they remain constrained by the overall sub-zonal limits of the CFE Treaty.

In addition, sub-limits on ACVs are provided for Pskov (600), Astrakhan (552); Volgograd (552); and eastern Rostov (310). Finally, the Flank Agreement imposes overall constraints on the Russian "original flank" zone of 1,800 tanks, 3,700 ACVs, and 2,400 artillery pieces. These overall constraints will limit the flow of equipment from the revised flank area to the "original flank" zone.

Thus, Russian TLE holdings in the regions near Ukraine, the Caucasus, Turkey, the Baltic and Nordic states will be constrained. Furthermore, the Russian areas bordering the Black Sea (Krasnodar Kray, western Rostov oblast) and the Baltic Sea/Barents Sea (Leningrad Military District) remain part of the flank zone. Both those features of the Flank Agreement meet important security concerns of Turkey, Ukraine, the Baltic states, and the Nordic states.

Russia has until May 31, 1999 to bring its accountable holdings in the realigned flank zone into full compliance with the treaty's flank limits. However, the Flank Agreement requires that Russia not increase its TLE holdings in the original flank zone after May 31, 1996, under the provisional application of the agreement.

The Flank Agreement recognizes that Russia has the right to seek to increase its TLE allowed in the

realigned flank zone through one or both of two mechanisms: reallocation of the Tashkent TLE quotas and use of the limited temporary deployments allowed under the treaty.

However, the agreement specifies that either outcome must be achieved by means of free negotiations and with full respect for the sovereignty of the states parties involved. These provisions in the Flank Agreement reinforce the provision in Article IV(5) of the treaty itself that, within the context of the CFE Treaty, a state party cannot station forces on the territory of another state party without its permission. Consequently, if a state party did so, it would be considered a violation of the treaty.

Finally, the Flank Agreement provides for additional transparency measures in the original flank zone, effective with provisional application. Ten supplementary declared site inspections may be conducted in the various areas removed from the flank zone. In addition, data required under the CFE Treaty information exchange provisions must be provided every six months for the original flank zone, rather than annually. For Kushchevskaya, periodicity is increased to every quarter.

Although the Flank Agreement gives Russia and Ukraine more flexibility in TLE deployments than they had before, it does not change the military

balance in the northern or southern regions. Nor does it adversely affect the security situation or the sovereignty of Russia's smaller neighbors. Instead, the Flank Agreement advances the security of Russia's neighbors, the United States and all states within the CFE area of application by its central contribution to ensuring the continued viability of the CFE Treaty.

When the United States and the other CFE parties entered into the flank negotiations, we had several fundamental aims: retain the integrity and viability of the CFE Treaty; preserve the security interests of all states parties and regional non-participating states near Russia's flank region; and accommodate if possible the legitimate TLE needs of Russia and Ukraine in the flank zone. The Flank Agreement succeeded in meeting all those objectives. It gives Russia and Ukraine needed flexibility in their TLE deployments, but in a way that is limited in its geographic scope, numerically constrained, transparent, and consistent with their neighbors' security requirements. It ensures the continued viability of the flank regime, which is a matter of critical importance to our flank allies and friends in the region.

The Department of Defense firmly believes that the Flank Agreement is in the best security interest of the United States and of all of Europe. ©

CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE): CURRENT TROOP/EQUIPMENT LEVELS AND CFE LIMITS

(data as of 1 January 1997 from ACDA and the International Institute for Strategic Studies)

	Manpower		Tanks		Armored Combat Vehicles		Artillery		Attack Helicopters		Combat Aircraft	
	<i>Limit</i>	<i>Holding</i>	<i>Limit</i>	<i>Holding</i>	<i>Limit</i>	<i>Holding</i>	<i>Limit</i>	<i>Holding</i>	<i>Limit</i>	<i>Holding</i>	<i>Limit</i>	<i>Holding</i>
												
Russia	1,450,000	818,471	6,400	5,541	11,480	10,198	6,415	6,011	890	812	3,450	2,891
Ukraine	450,000	400,686	4,080	4,063	5,050	4,847	4,040	3,764	330	294	1,090	940

NUCLEAR THREAT REDUCTION: AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION

*By Dr. Susan Koch
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Threat Reduction Policy*

The Department of Defense's Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program — which has accelerated the dismantlement of thousands of former Soviet nuclear weapons — represents a fundamental shift in the relationship between the United States and Russia away from Cold War mentalities, says Koch. The program, she notes, “addresses clear national security risks to both the United States and the recipient states, at a cost less than required to counter those threats by military means.”

The 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union left four successor states with nuclear weapons on their territories: Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. This sudden increase in potential members of the “nuclear club” posed a real threat to global stability and non-proliferation.

The Department of Defense's Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program is dealing with this threat by accelerating the dismantlement of thousands of former Soviet nuclear weapons, thereby ensuring that Russia is the sole nuclear inheritor of the former Soviet Union.

The CTR program was created in 1991 with passage by the U.S. Congress of the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act — also known as the Nunn-Lugar bill because it was proposed by Senator Richard Lugar and former Senator Sam Nunn. Funding for the program totals \$1,800 million, of which more than half is allocated for Russia.

At its inception, the CTR program addressed the immediate concerns about post-Soviet nuclear weapons and seized the opportunity to cement progress on U.S.-Soviet arms control.

CTR assistance in the removal of nuclear warheads to Russia for dismantlement encouraged Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan to become non-nuclear state signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and allowed the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) to enter into force.

Approximately 3,400 warheads were returned to Russia; Kazakhstan became nuclear-weapons free in 1995 and Ukraine and Belarus in 1996. The CTR assistance in weapons dismantlement has also allowed Russia to be ahead of schedule in meeting its START reduction commitments.

In addition to accelerating the rate at which the successor states dismantle weapons systems, the CTR programs make arms control irreversible. By directly assisting former Soviet states in the actual dismantlement, weapons reductions are assured. So far, 1,700 missiles and 760 launchers and bombers have been eliminated in Russia. The program permits weapons to be literally cut into pieces, never again to pose a threat.

While these state-to-state efforts reduce the threat of war, CTR also addresses fears that the domestic changes in the former Soviet Union could promote the leakage of weapons, material, and personnel. By protecting nuclear weapons while they are headed for dismantlement, CTR reduces the possibility that nuclear materials and weapons would be obtained by sub-national groups, terrorists, organized crime, or “rogue” states.

CTR assistance also provides equipment and training for the safe storage of weapons materials and for export controls. The threat posed by former Soviet nuclear material lies mainly in the concern that inadequate security makes it more likely that weapons material could leak out of the

country. The relaxation of domestic controls has made the previously invulnerable weapons complex very susceptible to theft. The sudden elevation of borders from internal ones to external makes them more porous to smuggling. By addressing the security, safety, control, accounting, centralization, and reduction of nuclear weapons and fissile material, CTR assistance helps greatly to reduce both the stockpiles and the possibility of proliferation.

To reduce the production of weapons-grade plutonium by reactors used for energy generation, CTR is currently negotiating an agreement with Russia to assist in the conversion of reactor cores so that only non-weapons-grade material will be produced. CTR was also an essential part of Project Sapphire, in which over 500 kilograms of highly-enriched uranium was brought to safe and secure storage in the United States.

Only recently has the international community faced the dangers of chemical weapons. The United States ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention in April 1997 and has long pledged that it will eliminate all of its chemical weapons. Russia — the only other declared chemical

weapons country — possesses the world's largest stockpile of chemical weapons. It is hoped that Russia will soon ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention as a signal of its commitment to the destruction of their chemical weapons. CTR has begun work toward building a destruction facility to initiate and accelerate Russia's chemical weapons destruction program.

Not only is the military-industrial complex vulnerable to theft, the scientists who have been employed by the once proud and extensive Soviet laboratory system are susceptible to offers of large compensation for their expertise by "rogue states." CTR-sponsored scientific centers are providing peaceful research opportunities to those scientists, both to reduce the former Soviet weapons complex and to prevent the scientists from leaving for lucrative jobs in other countries.

Other CTR programs address remaining issues of post-Soviet era weapons. CTR sponsors defense and military contacts that help overcome lingering Cold War mentalities on both sides. In addition to the four states already mentioned, CTR conducts programs to facilitate military-to-military contacts in other former Soviet states. By working

Former Ukrainian, U.S. and Russian defense ministers water sunflowers freshly planted atop a former SS-19 ICBM silo site in Prevomaysk, Ukraine. The silo was dismantled under the ongoing U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.



Department of Defense photo by R.D. Ward

to expand bilateral exchanges and visits, CTR helps build transparency, reform their militaries along more democratic lines, and foster mutual respect and shared interests. These contacts serve to mitigate or eliminate the dangers of their remaining weapons of mass destruction infrastructure.

There are currently four CTR umbrella agreements — with Russia, Belarus, Kazakstan, and Ukraine. Umbrella agreements to begin CTR programs in Moldova, Georgia, and Uzbekistan have recently been signed. Extending the CTR program to those states encourages them to become full members of the international community.

All of the programs that CTR administers address clear national security risks to both the United

States and recipient states, at a cost less than required to counter those threats by military means. CTR programs address the ongoing weapons of mass destruction threat at the source.

Instead of acting as adversaries, the United States and the newly independent states are working together for mutual benefit. CTR focuses on the opportunity to reduce the potential dangers of excess weapons of mass destruction and to support defense industry reforms. While CTR reduces the threat to the United States of former Soviet weapons of mass destruction, it does so in a manner that both reflects and furthers the cooperative relationship being built by the U.S. and our former adversaries. ©

AFTER PEACE AGREEMENTS ARE SIGNED, THE LANDMINES REMAIN

An interview with Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy

Leahy is a leader in the international campaign against the production, use, and export of anti-personnel landmines. As a U.S. delegate to the United Nations in 1994, he introduced in the U.N. General Assembly a U.S. resolution calling for the eventual elimination of landmines; the measure was unanimously adopted. The senator says he applauds President Clinton's "desire to see us rid the world of landmines," but he believes that the Ottawa negotiating process will be a better, faster means of achieving that goal than will the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament. He was interviewed by Co-Managing Editor Jacqui Porth.

QUESTION: Why have landmines been particularly singled out as being a serious arms control issue?

LEAHY: Today, it is estimated that there are already as many as 100 million landmines in the ground in 65 to 70 countries. These mines maim or kill some 25,000 people every year, predominantly civilians. I had a Cambodian sit in my office in Vermont and tell me that in his country they are clearing landmines an arm and a leg at a time.

It is a serious issue. Once a war has ended, and one side wins or a peace agreement is signed, the armies march away, the tanks roll away, the guns are unloaded, but the landmines stay. And 10 years later farmers still can't go into their fields, children still can't walk down a road to school, animals can't go to the watering hole, and large areas of the country are uninhabitable and unusable because the landmines are still there — oftentimes in places where no one can remember who put them down or which side did it.

Q: In January, President Clinton urged the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva to negotiate, as soon as possible, a global, comprehensive ban on landmines. Do you view this as important and why?

LEAHY: I think what the president has called for, a global ban, is important, but I think the CD is not where it's going to happen. It is a very comfortable

place to negotiate. They can go on for years. They haven't even agreed to a format of negotiations yet. As a practical matter, any one country can veto anything the CD attempts to do because it is supposed to be a case where either everybody agrees or nobody agrees.

I've often said that if you really want to negotiate a landmine agreement, take a table and put it out in a field in sub-Saharan Africa or Cambodia or some country heavily laid with landmines and tell the negotiators that they are going to have to work their way up to the table in the middle of the field. And, if they don't agree to a total ban on the first day, the table will be in a different field on the second day. Well, of course, they'd reach agreement in a hurry. But there is no urgency when you sit in Geneva.

So I applaud the president's desire to see us rid the world of landmines, but I think his administration's proposal is one that's bound to fail. I believe the "Ottawa Process" is far better. This is a process designed to have as many countries as possible join this winter in Canada and sign an agreement. The signatories won't produce landmines; they won't export landmines; they won't use landmines. And we have 90 countries or more that have pledged to sign, and these 90 countries are not insignificant countries — you have Germany, Belgium, Italy, the United Kingdom, South Africa, Mozambique, which has

an enormous landmine problem, and Angola, which has another enormous problem. These are countries that might claim their own need for landmines, but they are willing to give them up. And if the United States joined in that, I think the momentum would be such that all but a handful of countries would end up joining the ban. And those countries not joining would become pariahs.

Q: Other than the difference in the timeframe, do you see other differences between the two approaches?

LEAHY: The timeframe is probably the biggest difference because Canada is talking about having a concrete agreement by the end of this year. And by just sheer force of momentum, they probably will. The CD could go on for years and years, during which millions of more landmines are going to be laid.

Even if we joined Canada and we push for as many signatories as possible by December, I have no thought that we would have every country in there, especially not Russia and China. But it would be like the Chemical Weapons Convention — we would have most countries and the onus would be on those that had not joined.

In the Kennedy administration, President Kennedy unilaterally announced a nuclear test ban and challenged other nations to join with us, and eventually they did because we had set the moral example.

President Reagan did the same thing with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC): challenged other countries to join us and, eventually, most did. And President Bush negotiated it, and President Clinton, to his credit, pushed the CWC through a reluctant Senate. Even though we don't have all countries involved, we have most countries as a good solid step forward.

Well, far more innocent people have been killed and maimed by landmines than by either nuclear weapons or chemical weapons. And I would argue that the same philosophy that drove us to

the Test Ban Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention should drive this.

Q: What is Congress's role in helping achieve a landmine ban?

LEAHY: Normally an arms control initiative will come from the president, and Congress reacts either for or against it, especially in the case of a treaty, which requires Senate approval. This is the only time I know of where the Congress has taken the lead. Sixty Senators have joined, and there probably will be more, in sponsoring the Landmine Elimination Act of 1997, also known as the Leahy-Hagel bill, which bans new deployments of anti-personnel landmines by the United States beginning on January 1, 2000. The only exception is the Korean Peninsula, where the president has the authority to delay applying the ban.

Q: Why do you think Congress has been so active on the landmine issue?

LEAHY: Well, I've been pushing it hard. I'm not the only one, but I've been pushing it very hard for eight years. Congress first passed in 1992, over strong Pentagon opposition, the Leahy amendment, which said the United States could not export or transfer landmines for one year. That moratorium on exports has been renewed and has now become U.S. policy. Then, over very strenuous Pentagon opposition, a bill passed in 1996, that we could not use landmines for one year beginning in 1999, just to demonstrate that we can get along without them. That measure also extended the moratorium on exports.

On this latest one, I literally went around to virtually every senator and made my case. And it's an issue that, when you stop and think about it, people understand. For example, every senator who was a Vietnam combat veteran has joined this legislation. We have, among those who have joined, a large number of recipients of Purple Hearts, at least one Silver Star, a Congressional Medal of Honor, and numerous other citations. These are people who have been in battle, who have been wounded in battle, who have been distinguished for their valor in battle.

Q: In sponsoring landmine legislation, what have you and your counterparts in the House of Representatives hoped to accomplish?

LEAHY: I hope that eventually the president will realize that the process in Geneva, the CD, is moving too slowly, will not accomplish a great deal, and that he will come to actively endorse our legislation, which would put the United States into the Canadian process and in a position of moral and strategic leadership on this issue. I think its doable and I think if we do this, a future generation will be very thankful to the United States.

Q: What is your view of the U.S. role in promoting and expanding humanitarian demining programs?

LEAHY: I think we should. Most of the money that has been spent on demining is money that has come from amendments — sponsored by myself and several of the other anti-landmines senators — to the defense appropriations bill. We just got more money for this purpose in the fiscal year 1998 bill, and we'll continue to support it. But we could spend billions (thousands of millions) on demining and it wouldn't clear all the mines.

Last year, among all the different countries engaged in demining, several hundred million dollars was spent, but that succeeded in removing only a fraction of the number of additional mines that are being laid. You remove one mine and somewhere five more are being laid down.

One of the real problems is that a lot of countries have agricultural potential — where people could at least raise the crops to feed their children and live lives — but they can't get to the fields. If you know a field has one landmine, it might as well have a hundred.

So we should do everything possible to help in demining, but the best way is to stop using any more mines. As a practical matter you're not going to have real development go on in Bosnia, in parts of Central America, Africa, the Mekong Delta, and other places until you get rid of the landmines.

Q: Do you have any hope for any of the anti-personnel landmine alternatives that are being considered?

LEAHY: There is one that the Pentagon touts as a "smart mine" (one that deactivates after a short period of time), and I say show me the mine that is smart enough to know the difference between a child and a soldier. They are not as fool proof as they like to think they are. Most commanders said they would not trust the mines to turn themselves off before they march their own troops through.

If you want to set up a defense perimeter for your own troops, there are all kinds of ways of doing this. There are command-detonated mines, which require somebody to pull the trigger other than the victim. There are all kinds of new surveillance techniques, and these are what I would go to.

Anybody can argue that somewhere there is a military advantage to using landmines. I could also point out how I might command the most powerful, best equipped and trained Army in history, but my soldiers are still going to lose arms and legs from \$5 landmines.

Q: You have said that landmines have some marginal military value. What value is that?

LEAHY: The marginal value is that you can set up a perimeter defense for your people. If you are expecting a larger force to attack, you can slow them down or channel them into a particular area, but the little advantage that you get from that is far outweighed by the disadvantage when you have to send your own troops out when there are mines on the other side, and the disadvantage we face when American soldiers end up killed or injured by our own mines.

Q: Why did you exempt, in the Leahy-Hagel legislation, the Claymore and anti-tank mines?

LEAHY: The Claymore mine is command-detonated. A child won't set it off by touching it. Somebody has to pull the trigger. The same with anti-tank mines, you can step on those without them going off.

Q: Tell me a little about the fund you set up for victims of landmines?

LEAHY: The Leahy War Victims Fund — which was created as a part of the foreign aid budget beginning in 1989 — spends \$5 million per year to buy prosthetics and help rehabilitate victims, primarily victims of landmines. It doesn't take sides; it goes wherever it can be used. The fund has helped a lot of people in very poor countries who would never have been able to afford an artificial limb.

Q: You've had to propose extending the U.S. moratorium on export of landmines at least once now. Do you anticipate having to do so again?

LEAHY: No. The administration has adopted it as its policy, and I think that will be enacted into permanent law. I'd like to tie it into the whole Leahy-Hagel bill. I'll be talking to the president about it. ©



DOD photo by Army Staff Sgt. M.A. Jones.

A Moldovan soldier probes for landmines as part of a field training exercise at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.

ARMS CONTROL CHRONOLOGY

A History of International Efforts in Arms Control

JUNE 17, 1925 — The “Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisoning or other Gases, and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare” (The Geneva Protocol) is signed.

JULY 16, 1945 — The U.S. conducts the world’s first nuclear test at Alamogordo Air base, New Mexico.

JUNE 14, 1946 — The U.S. presents the Baruch Plan for the international control of atomic energy. It called for the establishment of an international authority to control potentially dangerous atomic activities, license all other atomic activities, and carry out inspections.

NOVEMBER 1949 — The U.S. and six Western European nations create the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) to prevent the transfer of militarily useful technology to the communist world.

DECEMBER 8, 1952 — The U.S. presents an “Atoms for Peace” plan that leads to the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957.

APRIL 16, 1953 — U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower proposes that nations limit the portion of total production of strategic materials devoted to military purposes in his “Chance for Peace” speech.

APRIL 2, 1954 — Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru is the first to propose a “standstill agreement” on nuclear testing.

AUGUST 30, 1954 — President Eisenhower signs the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which authorizes the exchange of information for the peaceful use of atomic energy with other countries

and supports the development of commercial nuclear power.

JULY 21, 1955 — President Eisenhower presents his “Open Skies” plan, designed to protect nations against military buildup and surprise attack.

AUGUST 29, 1957 — Following consultations among the NATO allies and other nations, the West presents to the United Nations a working paper entitled “Proposals for Partial Measures of Disarmament,” intended as “a practical, workable plan to start on world disarmament.” The plan would stop all nuclear testing, halt production of nuclear weapons materials, start a reduction in nuclear weapons stockpiles, reduce the danger of surprise attack through warning systems, and begin reductions in armed forces and armaments.

JULY 1, 1958 — A Conference of Experts, proposed by President Eisenhower, convenes in Geneva, bringing together scientists from the U.S., Britain, the Soviet Union, France, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Poland to examine nuclear test ban verification issues. The experts’ report concludes that a Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) in the atmosphere, underground and underwater can be verified by use of some 160 monitoring stations around the world. Nuclear tests beyond 50 kilometers from Earth would escape detection by existing technology.

OCTOBER 31, 1958 — The U.S., the Soviet Union, and Britain begin the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, as proposed by President Eisenhower. Within a few days, the Soviet Union joins the U.S. and Britain in a one-year testing moratorium.

DECEMBER 1, 1959 — The U.S., the Soviet Union, and 10 other countries sign a treaty to

internationalize and demilitarize the Antarctic continent. It entered into force on June 23, 1961.

FEBRUARY 13, 1960 — France explodes its first nuclear device at a test site in the Sahara Desert.

MAY 2, 1960 — After a U.S. U-2 reconnaissance plane is shot down over Sverdlovsk, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev cancels the “Big Four” Paris Summit, halting seeming progress in test ban negotiations. Negotiations reconvene in March 1961.

SEPTEMBER 1, 1961 — Citing French tests and the tensions created by the Berlin crisis, the Soviet Union announces plans to resume testing.

JUNE 20, 1963 — In the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis, the U.S. and the Soviet Union sign a Memorandum of Understanding in Geneva to establish a direct “hotline” communications link between the two nations for use in a crisis.

AUGUST 5, 1963 — The U.S., Britain, and the Soviet Union sign the Limited Test Ban Treaty, barring nuclear testing in the atmosphere, underwater, and in outer space. It entered into force October 10.

OCTOBER 16, 1964 — China explodes its first nuclear weapon at Lop Nor on the Qinghai Plateau.

FEBRUARY 14, 1967 — The Regional Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America — the Treaty of Tlatelolco — is signed in Mexico City. The treaty entered into force on April 22, 1968.

JULY 1, 1968 — The U.S. and 61 other nations sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obliging states without nuclear weapons at the time not to make or acquire such weapons, and requiring all parties to pursue negotiations on arms control and disarmament. It was extended indefinitely on May 11, 1995.

NOVEMBER 17, 1969 — The U.S. and the Soviet Union open the Strategic Arms Limitation

Talks (SALT I) in Helsinki to discuss limits on both strategic nuclear offensive weapons and anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems.

NOVEMBER 25, 1969 — The U.S. renounces the first use of chemical weapons and all methods of biological warfare.

MARCH 1971 — The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Exporters Committee, known as the Zangger Committee, is established as the first major international effort to develop export controls on nuclear materials.

MARCH 5, 1970 — The NPT enters into force.

SEPTEMBER 30, 1971 — The U.S. and the Soviet Union sign an Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War.

APRIL 10, 1972 — The U.S. signs the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), which bans the development, production, testing and transfer of microbial and toxin agents for offensive military purposes.

MAY 26, 1972 — President Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev sign in Moscow the basic SALT I documents limiting strategic offensive arms; both enter into effect on October 3 of that year. SALT I expired in October 1977.

MAY 26, 1972 — The U.S. and the Soviet Union sign the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty limiting strategic anti-ballistic missile defenses.

MAY 18, 1974 — India conducts its only nuclear test at an underground test site in the Rajasthan Desert.

JULY 3, 1974 — The Threshold Test Ban Treaty is signed, prohibiting underground nuclear weapon tests of more than 150 kilotons and obliging parties to continue negotiations toward a Comprehensive Test Ban. The treaty entered into force on December 11, 1990.

JULY 3, 1974 — The U.S. and the Soviet Union sign a protocol reducing the number of ABM deployment areas permitted for each side from two to one.

JANUARY 22, 1975 — The U.S. ratifies the Geneva Protocol banning use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, which it originally signed in 1925.

AUGUST 1, 1975 — The U.S., the Soviet Union, and 33 other member states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) sign the Helsinki Final Act. The document initiates a series of agreements on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe.

MAY 28, 1976 — The Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty is signed, limiting the size of individual nuclear explosions to a yield of 150 kilotons. U.S. President Gerald Ford delays ratification of both this treaty and the earlier Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

JUNE 18, 1979 — The U.S. and the Soviet Union sign the SALT II Treaty in Vienna, replacing SALT I. The SALT II Treaty was never ratified.

DECEMBER 27, 1979 — Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Carter withdraws the SALT II Treaty from Senate consideration.

OCTOBER 1980 — Preliminary Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) talks between the U.S. and the Soviet Union begin in Geneva. The U.S. opening position calls for an equal ceiling on land-based theater nuclear missile systems.

OCTOBER 16, 1980 — China conducts its last atmospheric nuclear test.

MARCH 23, 1983 — U.S. President Ronald Reagan announces his intention to commit the U.S. to a research program to study the feasibility of defensive measures against ballistic missiles to maintain peace. The program becomes known as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

OCTOBER 27, 1983 — The U.S. and its allies agree to maintain NATO's nuclear capability at the lowest level consistent with security and deterrence, and to withdraw 1,400 U.S. nuclear warheads from Europe.

APRIL 1984 — The U.S. signs a nuclear trade pact with China after Beijing agrees to join the IAEA and accept IAEA inspection of any exported nuclear equipment and material.

JUNE 1985 — In reaction to the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War, the U.S., Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Australia and the 10 European Community countries establish the Australia Group to develop a system of export controls on precursor chemicals required to manufacture chemical weapons.

AUGUST 6, 1985 — Eight members of the South Pacific Forum sign the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty, or the Raratonga Treaty, establishing a nuclear-free zone in the southern Pacific.

DECEMBER 12, 1985 — North Korea formally accedes to the NPT and agrees to open a new 30-megawatt research reactor facility to IAEA inspections and safeguards.

SEPTEMBER 22, 1986 — The Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe adopts an accord, the Stockholm Document, designed to reduce the risk of war in Europe. NATO and Warsaw Pact member nations agree to give each other advance notice of all major military activities.

APRIL 7, 1987 — The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is established to slow the spread of missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction.

DECEMBER 8, 1987 — The U.S. and the Soviet Union sign the INF Treaty to eliminate all intermediate- and short-range land-based nuclear missiles, the first arms control agreement to eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons. It

features an extensive and comprehensive verification regime, including on-site inspections. The treaty entered into force June 1, 1988, and was fully implemented June 1, 1991.

DECEMBER 9, 1987 — The U.S. and the Soviet Union agree to conduct the Joint Verification Experiment, allowing each side to monitor a nuclear test conducted by the other. The Soviet Union monitors a test August 17, 1988, and the U.S. on September 14 of the same year.

JANUARY 26, 1988 — The U.S. On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) is established to carry out the on-site inspection, escort, and monitoring provisions of the INF Treaty. It later becomes responsible for the U.S. inspection activities required under other major arms control agreements.

JUNE/JULY 1988 — The U.S. and the Soviet Union hold the first session of the Special Verification Commission (SVC) for the INF Treaty in Geneva. The SVC resolves INF Treaty compliance questions and agrees upon measures necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the treaty.

MAY 12, 1989 — President Bush renews and expands upon President Eisenhower's 1955 "Open Skies" proposal and invites the Soviet Union and


other members of the Warsaw Pact and NATO to agree to unarmed surveillance flights over their territories.

JUNE 12, 1989 — The U.S. and the Soviet Union sign the Dangerous Military Activities Agreement, which commits both nations to seek to prevent four types of dangerous military activities during peacetime: unintentional or emergency entry into the national territory of the other side, hazardous use of laser devices, disruption of military operations in a mutually agreed upon "Special Caution Area," and interference with the command and control networks of either side.

MAY 22, 1990 — President Bush signs the Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act, making it illegal for the U.S. to develop or possess biological weapons.

JUNE 1, 1990 — The U.S. and the Soviet Union sign new verification protocols for the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties. They entered into force on December 11, 1990.

JUNE 1, 1990 — Presidents Bush and Gorbachev sign the bilateral "Agreement on Destruction and Non-production of Chemical Weapons and on Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention on Banning Chemical Weapons."



The first U.S. Pershing missile engine is destroyed in Texas in 1995 under the terms of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.

USAF photo by TSGT Tomoyasu

OCTOBER 24, 1990 — The Soviet Union conducts its last nuclear test before adhering to a unilateral moratorium.

NOVEMBER 17, 1990 — The U.S. and other member countries of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe agree to the Vienna Document 1990, which expands and improves upon the notification measures and information exchanges in the 1986 Stockholm Document. It also establishes a Conflict Prevention Center in Vienna.

NOVEMBER 19, 1990 — The U.S. and 21 other NATO and Warsaw Pact nations sign the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, reducing five categories of conventional weapons to equal levels for each alliance grouping. The treaty entered into force July 17, 1992.

APRIL 3, 1991 — The U.N. Security Council passes Resolution 687 requiring the destruction of Iraq's nuclear capability, as well as its chemical and biological weapons, and of missiles with a range over 150 kilometers. The council establishes a Special Commission to monitor the elimination of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

MAY 28, 1991 — President Bush announces an arms control plan for the Middle East that includes a ban on weapons of mass destruction and a freeze on the acquisition, production, and testing of surface-to-surface missiles.

JULY 10, 1991 — South Africa formally joins the NPT as a non-nuclear state.

JULY 31, 1991 — U.S. and Russia sign the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), cutting their long-range nuclear forces from a Cold War high of between 11,000 and 12,000 warheads to between 6,000 and 7,000 for each side. The treaty entered into force on December 5, 1994.

SEPTEMBER 27, 1991 — President Bush announces the unilateral U.S. withdrawal from overseas bases and operational deployment of all land- and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons.


OCTOBER 5, 1991 — President Gorbachev, in response to President Bush's initiative, announces that the Soviet Union will immediately: stand down all strategic bombers currently on day-to-day alert status and store their weapons; stand down 503 ICBMs; stop the buildup of launching facilities for rail-based ICBMs; and discontinue development of small, mobile ICBMs and of a short-range attack missile for heavy bombers.

NOVEMBER 27, 1991 — The U.S. Congress passes the Nunn-Lugar legislation (formally known as the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act) to help the Soviet Union destroy nuclear, chemical, and other weapons. President Bush signs it in December, approving the first \$400 million in aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

DECEMBER 1991 — The U.N. General Assembly votes to formally establish a

Ukrainian Army personnel oversee the removal of an SS-19 ICBM from its underground silo in Pervomaysk preparatory to destroying it under the provisions of the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.

Department of Defense photo by R.D. Ward



Register of Conventional Arms. Beginning April 30, 1993, the U.N. will maintain a register to which states voluntarily report their arms exports and imports in seven major categories of weapons.

JANUARY 20, 1992 — North and South Korea agree to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.

MARCH 9, 1992 — China becomes the fourth nuclear weapon state to accede to the NPT.

MARCH 24, 1992 — The Open Skies Treaty is signed during a meeting of the CSCE in Helsinki.

MAY 23, 1992 — The U.S., Belarus, Kazakstan, Russia, and Ukraine sign the Lisbon START Protocol under which all five countries become parties to START and the CIS states agree to join the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states.

AUGUST 3, 1992 — France, the last of five acknowledged nuclear weapon states, joins the NPT.

SEPTEMBER 23, 1992 — The U.S. conducts its last nuclear test.

OCTOBER 9, 1992 — The CIS states sign the Bishkek Agreement pledging to support and implement the ABM Treaty.

OCTOBER 22-23, 1992 — Belarus agrees to transfer its nuclear missiles to Russia.

JANUARY 3, 1993 — U.S. and Russia sign the START II Treaty to further reduce intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) by eliminating MIRVed (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle) ICBMs and cutting the number of overall warheads for each side to between 3,000 and 3,500.

JANUARY 13, 1993 — The United States signs the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). As of June 11, 1997, 95 nations, including the U.S., had ratified the convention.

MARCH 1993 — North Korea refuses to accept a special IAEA inspection team, and subsequently announces its decision to withdraw from the NPT.

JULY 22, 1993 — Belarus formally accedes to the NPT and signs three agreements with the U.S. releasing Nunn-Lugar funding for denuclearization assistance.

NOVEMBER 17, 1993 — In view of the changed security environment, the 17 COCOM members agree to abolish the organization and start a new, broader one.

DECEMBER 16, 1993 — The U.N. General Assembly approves by consensus resolution 48/70 supporting the multilateral negotiation of the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty). This is the first time that a consensus resolution in support of a CTBT has been adopted by the assembly.

JANUARY 14, 1994 — The United States, Russia, and Ukraine sign the Trilateral Statement, providing for the transfer of strategic nuclear warheads on Ukrainian territory back to Russia. The transfer is completed by June 1996.

JUNE 23, 1994 — U.S. Vice President Al Gore and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin sign an agreement to shut down by the year 2000 the remaining plutonium production reactors operating in Russia.

OCTOBER 23, 1994 — The United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) sign an "Agreed Framework" to freeze the North Korean nuclear program and halt the DPRK's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

DECEMBER 5, 1994 — Ukraine accedes to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state.

MAY 12, 1995 — The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is extended indefinitely.

JUNE 13, 1995 — French President Jacques Chirac announces that France will resume nuclear testing in September with a series of eight tests in the South Pacific to last until May 1996. Two months later, in the face of negative reaction, France announces the tests will end more quickly.

AUGUST 11, 1995 — President Clinton announces that the U.S. will support a true zero-yield CTBT banning any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.

NOVEMBER 17, 1995 — Equipment reductions are completed under the CFE Treaty and its limits take full effect.

DECEMBER 15, 1995 — ASEAN, joined by Cambodia, Laos, and Burma, approves the creation of the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.

DECEMBER 19, 1995 — The U.S. and 27 nations establish the “Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies” as a successor to the COCOM, to devise new international controls on the spread of dangerous military technologies.

JANUARY 26, 1996 — U.S. Senate ratifies START II; the treaty awaits ratification by the Russian Duma.

JANUARY 27, 1996 — France conducts its sixth and final nuclear test. Five days later, President Chirac announces that France has finished testing “once and for all” and states that he is prepared to push for completion of a zero-yield CTBT in 1996.

MARCH 25, 1996 — The U.S. signs the protocols to the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty obligating the U.S. not to manufacture, acquire, test, or station any nuclear explosive device in the South Pacific.

APRIL 11, 1996 — Forty-three African nations sign the Pelindaba Treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa.

MAY 16, 1996 — President Clinton announces U.S. anti-personnel landmine (APL) policy, calling for a worldwide ban on production, transfer, and use of anti-personnel landmines.

JUNE 20, 1996 — India announces it will not sign the CTBT as drafted because it would still permit the nuclear weapon states to “continue refining and developing their nuclear arsenal.”

SEPTEMBER 10, 1996 — The U.N. General Assembly reconvenes and votes to adopt the CTBT and open it for signature at the earliest possible date. India, Bhutan, and Libya voted against, while Cuba, Lebanon, Syria, Mauritius, and Tanzania abstained.

SEPTEMBER 24, 1996 — President Clinton is the first head of state to sign the CTBT. He is followed by the other four declared nuclear powers and a host of non-nuclear states.

JANUARY 17, 1997 — President Clinton declares that the U.S. will pursue a comprehensive, global ban on anti-personnel landmines through the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and a permanent ban on APL export and transfer, as well as establish a stockpile cap at current inventory levels.

APRIL 24, 1997 — U.S. Senate ratifies the Chemical Weapons Convention.

APRIL 29, 1997 — Chemical Weapons Convention enters into force.

JUNE 26, 1997 — The Conference on Disarmament approves a proposal to appoint a special coordinator who will seek to develop a mandate for negotiations on anti-personnel landmines and names Australian Ambassador John Campbell to the post. ●

ARMS CONTROL FACT SHEET

Review of Current Major Arms Control Issues

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) — which entered into force on April 29, 1997, shortly after ratification by the U.S. Senate — is a global treaty that bans an entire class of weapons of mass destruction.

Under the CWC, each state party undertakes never, under any circumstances, to: develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone; use chemical weapons; engage in any military preparation to use chemical weapons; and assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a state party under the convention.

In addition, each state party undertakes to: destroy the chemical weapons it owns or possesses or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control; destroy all chemical weapons it abandoned on the territory of another state party; and destroy any chemical weapons production facilities it owns or possesses or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control.

The CWC helps to combat two of the gravest security challenges of the post-Cold War era — the spread of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. The treaty goes further than any other arms control agreement to date in applying pressure to those outside. Nations who refuse to join the convention will find themselves unable to trade in many chemicals that can be used to make poison gas. By restricting the flow of chemicals that can be used to make poison gas, the CWC makes it more difficult and more costly for terrorists to acquire or use chemical weapons.

The first session of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, created in The Hague to implement the convention, was held in May 1997. The states parties to the CWC will review its progress in the sixth and eleventh years following entry into force.

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which bans all nuclear explosions, was negotiated in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD) between January 1994 and August 1996 and opened for signature at the United Nations on September 24, 1996. President Clinton was the first to sign the treaty. As of July 8, 1997, 144 countries had signed, including all five nuclear-weapons states.

The CTBT will enter into force six months after the articles of ratification by 44 nations — named in the treaty as having nuclear power or nuclear research reactors — are deposited with the United Nations, but in no case earlier than two years after the treaty was opened for signature. To date, three of the 44 — India, Pakistan and North Korean — have not signed. So far, only four nations have deposited their instruments of ratification.

The treaty states that each signatory has the basic obligation “not to carry out any nuclear-weapons test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control.” Each CTBT party also is obliged “to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear-weapons test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.”

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

The United States and representatives of 60 other countries signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) at White House ceremonies on July 1, 1968; the treaty entered into force in 1970. Today, 185 countries have become parties to the NPT, making it the most widely adhered to arms control agreement in history.

The basic provisions of the treaty are designed to: prevent the spread of nuclear weapons; provide assurance, through international safeguards, that peaceful nuclear activities in states that do not possess nuclear weapons will not be diverted to making such weapons; promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and express the determination of the parties that the treaty should lead to further progress in comprehensive arms control and nuclear disarmament measures.

At the fifth NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995, states parties agreed to extend the treaty indefinitely and without conditions.

The United States is strongly committed to the NPT, to efforts that further strengthen the treaty, and to the broader international non-proliferation and arms control regime. The U.S. hopes that all NPT parties will work together to ensure that the 2000 NPT Review Conference further strengthens the NPT and reinforces global non-proliferation objectives.

FISSILE MATERIAL PRODUCTION CUTOFF TREATY

A Fissile Material Production Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) would prohibit the five nuclear weapons states (as well as all the other parties to the treaty) from producing fissile material for nuclear explosives or outside of international safeguards. President Clinton, in his September 24, 1996 address to the U.N. General Assembly, called on the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to take up “immediately” the challenge of negotiating such a treaty.

Clinton had first called for cutoff negotiations in his 1993 address to the U.N. General Assembly,

and in December 1993 the UNGA passed a consensus resolution calling for the negotiation of a “nondiscriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.” In March 1995, the CD agreed by consensus to establish an Ad Hoc Committee with a mandate to negotiate a cutoff treaty based on the 1993 UNGA resolution.

However, despite widespread international support for an FMCT, formal negotiations on cutoff have not yet begun in the CD. The CD can only approve decisions by consensus, and since the summer of 1995, the insistence of a few states to link FMCT negotiations to other nuclear disarmament issues has brought progress on the cutoff treaty there to a standstill. The United States continues to seek the initiation of FMCT negotiations at the CD on terms consistent with the March 1995 mandate.

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) bans the development, production, stockpiling, or acquisition of bacteriological and toxin weapons. The United States — which had unilaterally renounced biological and toxin weapons in 1969 — submitted its instruments of ratification to the convention in March 1975. There are currently some 139 states parties to the convention with an additional 18 countries who have signed the pact but not ratified it.

Three BWC review conferences have been held since 1972. At the second review conference in 1986, the parties agreed on a set of confidence building measures (CBMs), including the exchange of data on biological research laboratories that meet very high safety standards, sharing information on all outbreaks of infectious diseases caused by toxins which deviate from the normal, encouraging publication of results of biological defense research in scientific journals, and promoting scientific contact.

At the third review conference in 1991 states parties strengthened the existing CBMs and added

two new ones: declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological research and development programs, and declaration of vaccine production facilities. In addition, an Ad Hoc Group, open to all states parties, was created to consider appropriate measures to strengthen the convention and draft proposals in a legally binding instrument.

MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME

The cornerstone of U.S. missile non-proliferation policy is the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which was formed in 1987 by the United States, Britain, Canada, Japan, then West Germany, Italy, and France. Today there are 28 member nations, and an increasing number of countries are unilaterally observing MTCR guidelines.

The purpose of the MTCR is to restrict the proliferation of missiles, unmanned air vehicles, and related technology for systems capable of carrying a 500 kilogram payload at least 300 kilometers, as well as systems designed to deliver weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The regime originally focused only on nuclear capable delivery systems, but in January 1993 the partners extended the guidelines to cover delivery systems for all WMD (nuclear, chemical, and biological.)

The MTCR is neither a treaty nor an international agreement but is a voluntary arrangement among countries which share a common interest in halting missile proliferation. The regime consists of common export policy applied to a common list of controlled items. Each member implements its commitments in the context of its own national export laws.

At their 11th Plenary Meeting in October 1996, MTCR partners built on earlier meetings on the regional aspects of missile proliferation and transshipment issues and agreed to continue to exchange views on the role of the regime in dealing with missile-related aspects of regional tensions. Partners also noted with satisfaction a continuing readiness by non-member countries to observe MTCR guidelines.

TREATY ON OPEN SKIES

The Open Skies Treaty — signed in March 1992 in Helsinki, Finland — promotes openness and transparency in military activities through reciprocal, unarmed observation overflights. Designed to enhance security confidence, the treaty gives each signatory the right to gather information about the military forces and activities of other signatories.

First proposed to the Soviet Union in 1955 by President Eisenhower, the concept lay dormant until proposed again by President Bush in 1989. Negotiations began that year between member states of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact. Today, the treaty has been signed by 27 countries.

The Open Skies Treaty will enter into force 60 days after ratification by 20 signatories, which must include all those subject to eight or more overflights each year after full entry into force. These are Belarus, Russia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States. The treaty was ratified by the United States in November 1993. Of the above signatories, only Belarus, Russia and Ukraine have yet to ratify the treaty as of July 1997.

Signatories must submit their overflight requests for each coming year to all other signatories and to the Open Skies Consultative Commission, the organization established by the treaty to facilitate implementation. The treaty specifies the maximum number of overflights that each signatory must accept annually. After full implementation, the United States is obliged to accept 42 overflights per year.

ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY

The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, signed in 1972 by the United States and the Soviet Union, prohibits the development, testing, or deployment of a sea-based, air-based, or mobile land-based national defense system against strategic ballistic missile attacks. In 1974, the two parties to the treaty agreed that each of them would be allowed

one ABM deployment area. While Russia continues to maintain an ABM defense of Moscow, the United States deactivated its ABM site in 1976 after briefly using it to defend its intercontinental ballistic missile silo launcher area near Grand Forks, North Dakota.

To promote implementation of the treaty's provisions, the parties established the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), which meets at least twice a year. A review of the treaty is conducted every five years. The fourth review of the ABM Treaty, held in 1993, reaffirmed the participants' commitment to the pact and advocated efforts to strengthen it.

At the Helsinki Summit in March 1997, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that the six missile defense systems aimed at protecting soldiers on the ground, which are currently being developed by the United States as part of the theater missile defense program, are permitted by the treaty, though final technical details are still to be worked out.

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the question of treaty succession arose. On May 14, 1997, the U.S. Senate unanimously approved an amendment to the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty that included an unrelated, Republican-backed provision requiring the president to seek Senate approval, as a formal amendment to the ABM Treaty, for an agreement to extend the parties of the treaty to include Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakstan, the successor states of the former Soviet Union.

The administration maintains that it is premature to speculate on whether or when it might be necessary to negotiate changes to the ABM treaty should a future U.S. decision be taken to deploy a national missile defense.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

The Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program is designed to deal with the immediate potential

threat, to U.S. allies and some U.S. forces deployed overseas, of short-range ballistic missiles, as well as the future proliferation threat of longer-range ballistic missiles to the continental United States.

The BMD program includes three components: Theater Missile Defenses (TMD), National Missile Defenses (NMD), and advanced ballistic missile defense technologies.

Theater defenses seek to defend U.S. and allied forces against short-range ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. There are two types of TMD: a set of lower-tier systems that will intercept missile targets at relatively low altitudes in the atmosphere, and upper-tier systems that will intercept outside the atmosphere and at greater ranges.

The NMD program involves developing and testing an integrated system to defend the continental United States against intercontinental ballistic missiles launched accidentally, or the intentional launch by rogue regimes of medium-range ballistic missiles. The fixed, land-based architecture of NMD would incorporate six elements: a ground-based interceptor; ground-based radar; upgraded early warning radars; forward-based X-band radars; a Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS); and a battle management, command, control and communications (BM/C3) system. The Department of Defense assumes that a fully operable NMD system could be ready for deployment as early as 2003, well ahead of intelligence community estimates of the requirement.

The third component of the BMD program will develop a robust technology base. This will enable the deployment of more advanced missile defense systems over time as the threat from ballistic missiles evolves. In preparation for the future, funds are being invested in Ballistic Missile Defense Support Technology Programs in a number of areas including advanced interceptor and sensor technologies and chemical lasers. ●

FACT SHEET: BANNING ANTI-PERSONNEL LANDMINES

Issued by White House Press Office, May 16, 1997

“Today I am launching an international effort to ban anti-personnel landmines. For decades the world has been struck with horror at the devastation that landmines cause.... To end this carnage, the United States will seek a worldwide agreement as soon as possible to end the use of all anti-personnel landmines.... We must act so that the children of the world can walk without fear on the earth beneath them.”

President Clinton
Washington, D.C., May 16, 1996

People in 64 countries, mostly in the developing world, face a daily threat of being killed or maimed by the estimated 100 million landmines in place today. Anti-personnel landmines (APL) claim more than 25,000 casualties each year, obstruct economic development and keep displaced persons and refugees from returning home. Mines will remain a growing threat to civilian populations for decades unless action is taken now.

NEW U.S. POLICY ANNOUNCED MAY 1996

To address this problem, on May 16, 1996, the President announced a new U.S. APL policy. This initiative sets out a clear path to a global ban on APL but ensures that as the United States pursues a ban, essential U.S. military requirements and commitments to our allies will be protected, as follows:

Global Ban: The United States is aggressively pursuing an international agreement to ban use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines with a view to completing the negotiation as soon as possible. The United States views the security situation on the Korean Peninsula as a unique case and in the negotiation of this agreement will protect our right to use APL there until alternatives become available or the risk of aggression has been removed.

Ban on Non-Self-Destructing APL: Effective one year ago, the United States unilaterally undertook not to use, and to place in inactive stockpile status with intent to demilitarize by the end of 1999, all non-self-destructing APL not needed to (a) train personnel engaged in demining and countermining operations, or (b) defend the United States and its allies from armed aggression across the Korean Demilitarized Zone.

Self-Destructing APL: Until an international agreement takes effect, the United States reserves the option to use self-destructing/self-deactivating APL, subject to the restrictions the United States has accepted in the Convention on Conventional Weapons, in military hostilities to safeguard American lives and hasten the end of fighting.

Annual Report: Beginning in 1999, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will submit an annual report to the President and the Secretary of Defense outlining his assessment of whether there remains a military requirement for the exceptions noted above.

Alternatives to APL: The President directed the Secretary of Defense to undertake a program of research, procurement, and other measures needed to eliminate the requirement for these exceptions and to permit both the United States and our allies to end reliance on APL as soon as possible.

Expanding Demining Efforts: The Department of Defense has undertaken a substantial program to develop improved mine detection and clearing technology and to share this improved technology with the broader international community. The Department of Defense is also significantly expanding its humanitarian demining program to train and assist other countries in developing effective demining programs.

PROGRESS TOWARD THE GLOBAL ELIMINATION OF APL SINCE MAY 1996

In the year since the President announced our new policy, significant progress has been made in a number of areas.

CALL FOR A GLOBAL BAN

On December 10, 1996, in the UN General Assembly, nations voted overwhelmingly (156-0) in favor of the U.S.-initiated resolution urging states to pursue an agreement to ban anti-personnel landmines.

At the opening of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on January 20, 1997 the United States began to work with other member nations to initiate negotiations on a comprehensive, global agreement to ban APL. This 61-member forum in Geneva, Switzerland includes most of the world's strongest landmine ban advocates and most of the world's major APL producers. It is the forum in which the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was negotiated, as well as the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Canada has initiated a process to develop a treaty (banning APL) among like-minded nations. The United States welcomes this process as providing momentum toward a global ban on APL and views it as complementary to negotiations in the CD.

EXPORT MORATORIUM

Since 1992, the United States has observed by law a temporary export moratorium on APL. This law expires in the year 2000.

On January 17, 1997, we announced that the United States will observe a permanent ban on export and transfer of APL. We will work to put this policy into law.

We have encouraged all other nations to join us in a permanent ban on APL export and transfer, to end forever the spread of these weapons. To date, more than 30 nations have joined us in declaring bans and moratoria on their exports.

TIGHTENING APL USE RESTRICTIONS

On January 7, 1997 at the opening of the 105th Congress, the President transmitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification the amended Mines Protocol to the 61-nation Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). The United States led the effort to strengthen the Protocol at the May 1996 CCW Review Conference. The Protocol establishes new norms that can protect civilians, even as countries work toward the goal of an APL ban.

The amended Mines Protocol expands the scope of the original Protocol to include internal armed conflicts, where most civilian mine casualties have occurred; requires that all remotely-delivered anti-personnel landmines be equipped with self-destruct and self-deactivation features with a combined reliability rate of 99.9 percent; requires that all non-self-destructing mines only be used within marked and monitored fields; and that all APL be easily detectable, to facilitate mine clearance.

APL STOCKPILES

As the President announced in May, the United States plans to destroy by the end of 1999 about three million non-self-destructing APL. Destruction of these mines is well underway and on schedule (more than 800,000 have been destroyed to date). The United States will retain only those non-self-destructing APL needed for training and for defense in Korea.

On January 17, 1997 the United States announced that we would cap our APL stockpile at the current

level of inventory. We encourage other nations to do so as well.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF APL ALTERNATIVES

As directed by the President, the Department of Defense has begun a Research and Development program to provide effective alternatives to APL. Requested funding for this program is \$3 million in Fiscal Year 1998 and \$5 million in FY 99.

HUMANITARIAN DEMINING PROGRAMS

In FY 1997, the United States will spend about \$28 million in cash and in-kind contributions for demining programs in 14 countries:

Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Jordan, Laos, Mozambique, Namibia, OAS/IADB regional program in Central America (Honduras, Costa Rica, Nicaragua) and Rwanda.

The United States seeks to establish indigenous, sustainable mine clearance and mine awareness training programs. The FY 98 budget request is about \$35 million for all demining programs.

- The United States has contributed substantially to demining activities in Bosnia, with the goal of ensuring the Bosnians can soon assume responsibility for their own demining program.
- Based on the success of the Superman DC Comic book for children in Bosnia, the United States is working to develop new educational tools such as interactive school programs, as well as radio and TV spots.
- To meet the growing demand for skilled deminers, the Department of Defense has expanded its pool of available trainers to more than 270.

— The Department of Defense has established a humanitarian demining information center at James Madison University (JMU). With DoD, JMU maintains a newly established humanitarian demining website (www.demining.brtrc.com).

NEW HUMANITARIAN DEMINING TECHNOLOGIES

In the last year DoD reviewed over 120 technologies specifically designed for humanitarian demining operations and 21 new projects have been selected for development. Prototypes of selected equipment have been fielded in Bosnia, Honduras, Laos, Cambodia, Mozambique and Rwanda. Program funding is \$14.4 million for FY 97. \$17.7 million is requested for FY 98.

NEXT STEPS

Much work remains:

Gaining early agreement to begin to negotiate a ban on APL in the Conference on Disarmament and enhancing complementarity between work in the Conference on Disarmament and the "Ottawa Process."

Developing alternatives so that the United States can end its reliance on APL as soon as possible.

Obtaining early entry-into-force of the Convention on Conventional Weapons amended Mines Protocol and expanding adherence to the Convention.

Continuing the expansion of humanitarian demining programs.

Developing and fielding new mine detection and clearing technology. ©

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KEY INTERNET SITES

Please note that USIS assumes no responsibility for the content and availability of the resources listed below which reside solely with the providers.

The Arms Control Association
<http://www.armscontrol.org/>

Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
<http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/html/bmdolink.html>

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace:
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Project
<http://ceip.org/nuclear.htm>

Center for International Security and Arms Control
<http://www-leland.stanford.edu/group/CISAC/>

Chemical and Biological Defense Information
Analysis Center
<http://www.cbiac.apgea.army.mil/body.html>

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Research
& Development Program
<http://www.ctbt.rnd.doe.gov/ctbt/>

Cooperative Threat Reduction
<http://www.dtic.mil/defenseink/pubs/ctr/>

Humanitarian Demining
<http://www.demining.brtrc.com/>

InfoManage International Nonproliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction
<http://infomanage.com/nonproliferation/>

International Atomic Energy Agency
<http://www.iaea.or.at/>

Key Arms Control Treaties and Agreements
<http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/fs7.htm>

Missile Defence: U.S.-Allied Cooperation
<http://www.cdiss.org/coopt.htm>

Nonproliferation and National Security Home Page
<http://www3.dp.doe.gov/nn/>

Nonproliferation, Arms Control, and International
Security (NAI) Directorate
<http://www.llnl.gov/nai/nai.shtml>

Nuclear Material Management Home Page
<http://www.ca.sandia.gov/NMM/>

Office of Fissile Materials Disposition
<http://web.fie.com/htdoc/fed/doe/fsl/pub/menu/any/>

On-Site Inspection Agency Public Affairs
http://www.osia.mil/pub_afrs/index.html

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons
<http://www.opcw.nl/ptshome2.htm>

Rules of Warfare; Arms Control
<http://www.tufts.edu/departments/fletcher/multi/warfare.html>

The Stimson Center
<http://www.stimson.org/list.htm>

United Nations: Centre for Disarmament Affairs
<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/docs/cdahome.htm>

The United Nations Demining Database
<http://www.un.org/Depts/Landmine/index.html>

The United States Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency
<http://www.acda.gov/>

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign: Program in
Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security
<http://acdisweb.acdis.uiuc.edu/> ●